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Here in "his most important book" (so the jacket informs us) a tired reformer finds
new magic. Korzybski, Ogden and Richards, Bridgman, Hogben, Frank, Arnold,
Robinson and others too numerous to mention have introduced Mr. Chase to the
"science" of semantics. His theses, borrowed from so many sources and offered without pretense of originality, are oversimple, obvious, old, inadequate, often superficial,
sometimes contradictory, and somewhat useful.
Failure of communication is Mr. Chase's devil; his heaven, the sweet reasonableness
into which men relapse when communication breaks through. "The world outside
has a natural pattern, order, structure." So does our nervous system. But "language
has not been reared to correspond to" these structures. It "has grown on a more
devious pattern." Two "besetting sins" dominate our use of language. "One is the
identification of words with things. The other is the misuse of abstract words." "Hot,"
"cold," "good," "bad," "capitalism," "communism," "fascism," "interstate commerce" and "due process" are treated like objects; "unwarranted identifications and
high order abstractions run riot." Men talk, argue, and fight without knowing what
they are talking, arguing, or fighting about.
Hope of salvation Mr. Chase finds in semantics. From Korzybski he borrows the
concept of levels of abstraction. In verbalizing about an object man can move from
the sub-microscopic level up through the microscopic and macroscopic levels to concepts of such generality as to be practically meaningless. Take a pencil. At the first
level it is a "mad dance of electrons"; then at the macroscopic level, a non-verbal
object which we can see and touch. Next comes the word, label, or symbol "pencil,"
and, at still higher levels, more elaborate description, pencils-as-a-class, and so on up
through "standard of living," "economic goods," "production," and "capitalism"
to "Western civilization" and "human culture." From Ogden and Richards, he takes
the concept of "referent." "Not a single word means anything in itself"; "The point
of every discussion is to find the referent"-the object, the pencil. Finally, from
Bridgman, he adds a touch of meaning for scientists, the "operations" test. "Concepts
not subject to operations are meaningless." This is as true of "Germany" and "credit"
as it is of "length." "Facts are the central exhibit of the scientific method.", The
sum of Mr. Chase's borrowings is a "young and difficult study." Its goal is to make
man conscious of abstracting, to enable him to find referents or to show the absence
of referents.
In the second half of the book Mr. Chase forages, in twenty page chews, through
his predecessors looking for referents. Naturally he finds very few. He ticks off the
philosophers from Aristotle to Hutchins in nineteen pages, turns with logicians for
eighteen ("Logicians tend to oppose the scientific method. . . ."!),shakes the economists right and left for twenty each and swings them for twenty-two more, goes round
and round with the judges for twenty, strolls with the statesmen for twenty-two, faces
the world outside for eleven, and ends up with an appendix of horrible examples,
including an earlier paragraph of his own.
The vitiating factor in Mr. Chase's analysis is, of course, in his restrictive use of
referent-his effort to confine the multiple functions of language to simple pointing
I In fairness, Mr. Chase states that "fact" is "an abstract term of a very high order"; yet
he seems to me to ignore this insight in most of the practical applications of his doctrines. His
stress is more on "the referent" than on consciousness of abstracting.
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to tangible particulars. Even he must continually violate his own canons. What are
the "referents" for "the scientific method," "the philosophic method," "the natural
structure of the world outside," "the human purpose," ".sanemen in general" (how
does this differ from the abhorred "mankind"?), or "the awful depths of language itself"? Are not even his key concepts--"semantics" and "referent"-somewhat
spooky? Communication, investigation, and experiment require abstractions of all
degrees of generality. To make our world manageable, we must subsume under categories, abstract from totality, and ignore "irrelevant" tangible particulars. The "big,
blooming, buzzing confusion" about us is yet to be reduced to static, atomistic elements
which can be given unique names for all time to come.
It is true, no doubt, as one of Mr. Chase's mentors has written, "that a name apart
from our uses of it is nothing but a shape on paper or an agitation in the air. ' ' 2 But
the uses of language are many. Sometimes it is used to promote, describe, or celebrate
moral attitudes. Such is the language of legal doctrine. The student who sets out to
find tangible referents for trust, title, lien, bailment and so forth is in a fair way to
drive himself neurotic. In Mr. Chase's own words: "There is not a reliable referent
in the whole litany." Nevertheless, these legal concepts do have an operational meaning (or meanings) in terms of judicial behavior and social context. Useful questions to
ask about such concepts are not whether they are tangible or intangible, true or false,
fiction or non-fiction but, if you are an advocate, whether or not they are persuasive,
or if you are a judge or legislator, whether you like the results to which they point,
or if you are a scientist, whether they aid in accurate description. To contemporary
law students nurtured onIHohfeld, Cook, Corbin and their followers all of this is old stuff.
In the realm of moral judgments other than "legal" the breakdown of Mr. Chase's
test of meaning is equally obvious. He ends up on chapter with a ringing plea for
statesmen to find "the human purpose to be accomplished in a given situation"; and
the "fraudulent concepts" of Hitler are to be destroyed by their own "falsity." But
he rejects the labor theory of value because "there is no operational foundation to
prove" it. He can find no referents for "the good," "justice" and so forth, and few
for Socialism, Communism, or Fascism; they are just blab, blab, blab. Hopefully, he
looks forward to the day when we can "dispense with concepts not derived from careful observation"; but he also adds "and from the necessities of survival and well-being
under the conditionsof this earth." These latter words open a wide door. The truth is
of course, that there can be no "operational foundation" to "prove" any theory of
value and that the emotive powers and ceremonial or consolatory functions of symbols
depend largely upon their lack of empirical referents. Can psychological and organizational needs be exorcised by showing that there is nothing immediately tangible behind
gods or ghosts or goal-words? Witness our insistent demand for a "constructive philosophy." What so excites Mr. Chase about the hope in semantics if not his own picture of Utopia?
In sum, Mr. Chase might well have heeded his own early warning: "A high and
mighty disdain for all discussion of abstract ideas is simply another form of mental
confusion." Yet his problem is important and his sources are important; it is to be
hoped that his words will exercise enough tyranny over his readers to drive some few
to such sources and beyond.
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